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I
INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic in the United States that adversaries in a civil case
bear full responsibility for bringing forth the evidence to be considered
in the determination of facts they dispute.  In developing their proofs,
each adversary is entitled to the assistance of every other person.
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an expression of that
general entitlement.1  It was revised in 1991 to simplify the procedure
for securing that assistance and to reduce the possibility that adver-
saries or counsel might abuse their considerable powers of investiga-
tion.2  It was not the purpose of that revision in any way to limit par-
ties’ access to proof genuinely needed to reveal discernible truth to the
trier of fact.
As a mark of the importance attached to the entitlement of adver-
saries to possible relevant evidence, Rule 45 authorizes any lawyer in
any action in any federal court to sign and issue a subpoena and
cause it to be served on any person found in the United States, in-
voking the power of the federal court in which that person is found to
coerce the desired disclosure.3  The person upon whom a subpoena is
served will be required, upon pain of punishment for contempt of
court,4 to supply testimony about matters within his or her knowledge
that might be evidence or that might lead to the discovery of evidence
useful to the party serving the subpoena.  He or she may also be re-
quired to produce documents or other tangible evidence in his or her
possession that may bear on issues in dispute, and even whole files
that might contain a useful document.
It is an additional mark of the importance of the right of adversar-
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ies to secure possibly relevant evidence that a citizen of the United
States may be compelled to provide information even if he or she can-
not be found in the United States but can only be found and notified
at some place outside the jurisdiction of the United States.5  Our gov-
ernment will routinely seek the cooperation of other governments to
compel persons outside our jurisdiction to provide useful information,
and has ratified a treaty to enable adversaries to seek such help from
foreign governments ratifying that treaty.6  To encourage such assis-
tance, our courts are required to lend their assistance to foreign
courts needing testimony, documents, or other things to resolve is-
sues of fact arising in litigation pending in foreign jurisdictions.7  This
assistance is offered without requiring the reciprocity of foreign
courts, reflecting our deep commitment to the value of truth, for ex-
ample, full revelation of evidence bearing on disputed facts.
For perspective, it is also helpful to bear in mind that a person ac-
cused of crime is at least equally entitled to coerce testimony from re-
luctant witnesses.8  It would be a denial of due process required by the
Fourteenth Amendment for a state to impose substantial adverse con-
sequences on a litigant without affording access to necessary proof.9
The reason for this commitment to secure necessary proof is not
hard to discern.  A judgment purporting to be a legal judgment that is
based on incomplete evidence is visibly infected with possible, often-
times even probable, error.  Parties suffering adverse judgments on in-
complete information have greater cause to protest and to resist.  Citi-
zens seeing these judgments have less reason to obey the law’s
commands.  Public confidence in the law and its processes, therefore,
requires that adversaries have access to any information they might
need to present to a court.  In the United States, the duty has added
importance because much of our law regulating dangerous or illicit
conduct is enforced by private parties represented by private counsel.
The public therefore has a stake not only in the justice of its courts’
judgments, but also in their effectiveness in imposing suitable conse-
quences on misdeeds.  For all these reasons, the duty to supply in-
formation in response to a subpoena is an essential instrument of any
effective process for enforcing law.
Two duties arising under Rule 45 and related provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bear examination in this article.  One
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9. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1982) (holding that the state of Connecticut
was required to bear the cost of blood testing of indigent defendant accused of fathering
the child of a public welfare client).
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is the duty of a scientific or technical expert not retained by a party to
testify to an opinion on a disputed scientific or technical issue.  The
second is the duty of a non-testifying and unretained scientist to dis-
close research data that might be useful to counsel in attacking testi-
mony ostensibly based indirectly on such data.  While these duties
should be enforced with due regard for competing interests of scien-
tists, they must at times conflict with and override honorable and le-
gitimate interests of science and scientists.  Rule 45 is an attempt to
secure an appropriate balance between the competing interests.  The
interests of science could be better protected than they are, but only
by reducing the role of partisan experts in the conduct of litigation.
We will conclude by suggesting two steps that would achieve such re-
ductions, both of which can be supported for reasons independent of
the concerns of scientists.
II
HISTORICAL PROGRESS OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION
A.  Origins of the Duty
The duty to give evidence has ancient origins.  It can be found on
the continent of Europe in the 15th century.  In England, the Statute
of Elizabeth in 1562 made attendance at trial, when summoned, a
duty of all Englishmen.  By 1742, Lord Hardwicke was to declare that
the public has a right to every man’s evidence.10  The Judiciary Act of
1789 explicitly imposed that duty, and an early revision authorized
subpoenas to run across district lines.  The Fees Act of 1853 provided
for routine but modest compensation for compelled witnesses.
John Henry Wigmore, in his accustomed oracular style, sonorously
proclaimed the duty.  He explained that each verdict upon each cause,
and each witness to that verdict, is a pulse of air in the beating organs
of the community.  The vital process of justice, he demanded, must
continue unceasingly; a single cessation typifies the prostration of so-
ciety; a series would involve its dissolution.11  Thus, he asserts, “the
impetus for this duty comes not from the parties but from the com-
munity as a whole—from justice as an institution, and from law and
order as indispensable elements of civilized life.”12  Recognizing that
performance of the duty is at best noisome, Wigmore asserted that its
burdens and hazards are the cost of living in an organized society.
When the course of justice requires the investigation of the truth, no
man has any knowledge that is rightly private.13  And one who would
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11. Id. at 66-67.
12. Id. § 2203, at 137.
13. Id. § 2192, at 66.
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withhold his evidence is not worthy of citizenship, should be expelled
from society, and required to live as a hermit.14
Strong words.  Yet justified.  In his great work, Wigmore devoted
hundreds of pages to the narrow exceptions and qualifications of that
duty.  Doubtless, exceptions and qualifications are necessary, but, as
Wigmore sensed, it would be all too easy for the exceptions and quali-
fications to consume the duty, for there are few of us who cannot give
a reason—and often a good reason—why we would prefer not to be in-
volved in other peoples’ disputes.  At the very least, there is an odium
to be borne.  Often, there is a risk of grave embarrassment.  Who
wishes to be cross-examined, even about one’s certain knowledge?  It
is the right, even the duty, of adversary counsel to make a source of
information harmful to the contentions of a client appear unreliable or
even dishonest.  Not uncommonly, one might fear some form of retri-
bution from those whose interests are threatened by testimony.  In
criminal cases, the giving of evidence can be worth a person’s life.  But
every time an excuse, even a good one, is honored, the result is a de-
cision on partial information, a decision that may very well be unjust
and contrary to the legal rights of disputants.  In addition, a guilty
person may be acquitted, an innocent one convicted, a wrong not
remedied, or a person made to bear consequences for which he or she
is not legally responsible.
Exceptions to the duty universally recognized in American juris-
dictions include the privilege for communications from a client to an
attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice.  Yet, even that ex-
ception is hedged with limitations and counter-exceptions.15  Most
states recognize a privilege for communications from a patient to a
doctor for the purpose of securing medical treatment.  Some recognize
a privilege for communications to a priest from a penitent seeking ab-
solution.  Many have long recognized a privilege for communications
between spouses, but that privilege is now eroding.16  As we have
lately been reminded, even presidents of the United States share the
duty to give evidence.17  Against this background, scientists and tech-
nical experts are very unlikely to receive serious judicial consideration
of claims for broad qualifications or exceptions that might exempt
                                                          
14. Id. at 72.
15. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 503(d)(5) (1993) (proposed) (no privilege when one attorney
represents two or more clients who are in conflict); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (no privilege when client voluntarily discloses information to a third party);
Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953) (no privilege if a crime is fur-
thered).
16. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (rejecting broad spousal
privilege).
17. See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff’d, 72 F.3d 1354
(8th Cir.), aff’d, 117 S. Ct. 1636  (1997); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).
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them.  They, too, have a duty to tell what they know when it bears on
disputed facts that a court must resolve.
On the other hand, as Wigmore acknowledged, and as our courts
have always conceded, the burden of giving evidence should be mini-
mized.  No party or lawyer has the right to use the subpoena to op-
press other persons with costs and consequences.  The subpoena
power is a large power to entrust to private counsel, and it is the duty
of the court to protect individuals against its misuse.  On this ac-
count, courts will often limit a particular subpoena or subject it to
conditions to accommodate the dutiful citizen with protections against
costs and burdens that are not necessary to the courts’ mission.  Sci-
entists and others having technical information can reasonably expect
to be protected from unreasonable costs or unnecessary disclosures.
Revised Rule 45 provides a framework for the consideration of their
interests case by case.18  There are, however, reasons why the pleas of
scientists and other experts for limitations and conditions on their
duty to provide information may have a special lack of appeal to the
courts to whom such pleas are addressed.  Such pleas can only be
considered in the light of a large and pressing problem faced only by
American courts and only in recent decades.  That problem is the
profligate use of opinion evidence at trial.
B.  Recent Increases in Opinion Evidence
Opinion evidence is testimony based on the supposed expertise of
the witness as a person having scientific or other technical informa-
tion not available to jurors or even to judges.19  Unlike perception wit-
nesses, opinion witnesses do not have personal knowledge resulting
from their observation of events in dispute.  An illuminating difference
is that the law of perjury has scant application to testimony presented
in the form of an opinion.
Opinion evidence was infrequently used in American litigation until
the last quarter century.  Impetus for its use was given by enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972,20 which eliminated seemingly
arcane restrictions on such presentations.  In other legal systems,
partly perhaps because they seldom, if ever, rely on juries, experts are
less frequently consulted.  If consulted, they are selected by the court,
their opinions are often expressed only in writing, or they are orally
examined only by a judge.21  Thus, in other countries, the interests of
scientists seldom collide with the interests of a court seeking their ad-
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20. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C.) (adopted by order of the Supreme Court on Nov. 20, 1972).
21. See GILLIAN M. WHITE, THE USE OF EXPERTS BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 15-28 (1965)
(describing the different manners in which European courts use experts).
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vice.
It is otherwise in contemporary America.  Although the Supreme
Court has recently imposed on federal district judges a responsibility
for screening out irresponsible or irrelevant opinion testimony,22 most
trial judges are reluctant to limit counsel in their use of this form of
proof. The length of civil trials in federal courts have increased no-
ticeably in the last two decades,23 and the presentation of opinion tes-
timony seems a likely cause.  A secondary effect of this development
has been the erection of a large industry that manufactures expert
opinion evidence in an enormous range of fields.  No one has yet
measured the billions spent each year by American litigants to buy
this new industry’s product, but it is a very large sum.  A still greater
sum may be spent in the time of professional lawyers preparing such
witnesses to testify and in preparing themselves to cross-examine ad-
versary experts.  It is not clear how many persons are earning all or
most of their income from the presentation of expert opinion evidence,
but certainly there are many who earn a great deal.  We have been
told of fees as large as a half million dollars for the testimony of a sin-
gle witness in a single case.
While expert witnesses cannot, consistently with lawyers’ ethical
duties, be employed on a contingent fee basis,24 more than a few such
experts know that there is little prospect that their client will be able
to pay their fees unless they prevail on the merits at trial.  Still more
know that their income as experts depends on their rate of success in
influencing outcomes.  Whether such hired testimony actually im-
proves the overall quality of decisions rendered remains open to dis-
pute.  One judge has described trials in his court as increasingly
similar to barking seal contests in which rival trainers compete to in-
duce their teams of trained experts to make the most winsome noises.
Certainly there is little doubt that many jurors and most judges per-
ceive such experts as hired guns or worse, and apply a substantial
discount when considering the opinions presented.  To be sure, there
are many honorable persons performing the role of partisan expert,
but the appearance of possible corruption or professional prostitution
is ubiquitous.  In fact, some organizations of professional scientists
have been concerned lest their whole professions be cast in disrepute
by the testimony of some members willing to conform their opinions to
the interests of litigants who have employed them.  Moreover, there
are many scientists and technical experts whose opinions could be
valued who are never available because they are unwilling to engage
                                                          
22. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23. Compare JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 164 (1950) with id. at 217 (1992).
24. Person v. Ass’n of the Bar of New York, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 924 (1977).
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in so questionable an activity unless compelled by law to do so.
There is no class of litigants, nor any class of partisan experts, who
may not reasonably be suspected of contriving false or unfounded
opinions for presentation at trial.  An unwelcome secondary effect of
the exponential growth in the use of expert testimony has been to in-
crease the advantages of wealth: In general, those who can afford to
pay more get opinion testimony that is more favorable to their conten-
tions.25  Who can afford the most expensive experts is in part a func-
tion of the stakes at issue.  A tertiary consequence of reliance on par-
tisan experts is the concentration of professional representation in the
offices of a relatively few lawyers having knowledge of a particular field
of alleged expertise and having funds available to invest in the pro-
curement of suitable opinion testimony.  The further ramifications of
these developments is beyond the scope of this article.  They are men-
tioned here only because they give added weight to the observation
that much more is at stake in the application of the subpoena power
to scientists and other technical experts than their own interests or
the interests of the parties to a particular dispute.  Our courts are
confronted with a pervasive phenomenon that often approaches and
sometimes crosses the line into the realm of scandal.  In preventing
the sale of experts’ snake oil at trial, courts may be more than justified
in requiring the help of those citizens having a special ability to pro-
vide help.
III
THE TESTIMONY OF UNRETAINED EXPERTS
The unretained expert is one who has not been employed by an ad-
versary to testify.  Retained experts or hired guns are subject to exten-
sive discovery pursuant to Rule 26.  While there may be problems re-
garding the scope of such discovery, they are not problems that are
the subject of this symposium or of this article.
There are two quite different situations in which a party might seek
testimony from an unretained expert.  One situation involves an ex-
pert who has been consulted by an adversary but not retained to give
testimony.  Such a person might be a particularly attractive witness
for the very reason that he or she has not been retained by the adver-
sary.  It is not uncommon for a party to search for the most effective
witness.  Those not selected to testify may, while they were under
consideration for retention, have acquired quite a lot of relevant in-
formation about matters in dispute.  They may also have formed
                                                          
25. See generally In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. Denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem.
Co. 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).  See also JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995); RICHARD B.
SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
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opinions unwelcome or adverse to the interests of the party who em-
ployed them to study the case.  Information acquired by such experts,
and opinions formed by them, are discoverable, but only under limited
circumstances.  The controlling provision is Rule 26(b)(4)(B),26 which
allows such discovery only as provided in Rule 35(b)27 or upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances in which it is impracticable for
the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same
subject by other means.28  This provision is related to the exception to
discovery set forth in Rule 26(b)(3) bearing on trial preparation mate-
rials.29  The animating idea behind both provisions is to allow adver-
saries to investigate their cases without undue fear that what they
learn will be immediately available to an adversary for use against
them.30  However, this principle affords only qualified protection even
to those to whom it applies.  The expert consulted but not retained to
testify may be required to disclose what she knows or thinks if the
information or opinion cannot be found elsewhere, as, for example, if
there are no equally qualified experts available to the discovering
party, or materials examined by the unretained expert are no longer
available.  There are, of course, issues arising in the administration of
Rule 26(b)(4)(B), but these, too, are not the subject of this symposium
or of this article.
The other situation—and the one of interest here—is the unre-
tained expert who has not been consulted or employed for any pur-
pose by any party, and who has no information specific to the par-
ticular matters at issue.  Generally, such experts are available for a
negotiable price sufficient to compensate time spent preparing and
providing testimony, but not always.  In some cases, there are indi-
viduals whose information or opinions have special value to a party
but who are unwilling to give testimony.  Under Rule 45(c)(3)(B), such
a person may be compelled to disclose an opinion or information not
describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting
from the expert’s study made not at the request of a party.  Such
compulsion is available only if the party seeking the opinion or infor-
mation shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that
cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship, and if the expert is
reasonably compensated.31  These restrictions go far beyond any that
are imposed on parties seeking information bearing on specific events
at issue.  They provide some protection for the value of the expert’s
intellectual property in his or her attained knowledge, but stop short
                                                          
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
27. Id. 35(b).
28. Id. 26(b)(4)(B).
29. Id. 26(b)(3).
30. See id. 26(b)(3)(4) advisory committee’s note.
31. Id. 45(c)(3)(B).
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of allowing an expert to refuse to participate when a party shows a
need for his or her help, and a willingness to pay a reasonable fee to
compensate for the effort expended by the expert in acquiring the val-
ued fund of information and professional judgment.
There is a large disincentive to parties seeking the help of such un-
retained experts that makes this provision almost unnecessary in
routine cases.  That disincentive is that a party will normally seek to
call only those experts who are congenial to that party and to that
party’s litigation contentions.  Even without the protection of Rule 45,
there is therefore little risk that large numbers of scientists would be
called upon to express opinions or supply information when they are
not willing to do so.  A party seeking to compel such testimony is very
likely in extremis.
There are, however, various circumstances in which a party may
show the requisite need to justify compelling a reluctant expert to tes-
tify.  First, there is no other available and qualified expert.  Second, an
unretained expert’s testimony may be needed to clarify factual issues
that are muddled by hired experts.32  Third, such testimony may be
necessary for informed cross-examination of retained expert.33  Finally,
in all such cases, scientists may contend that compelled testimony
burdens them more than those ordinary witnesses who testify about
events they observe.  Specifically, it is said that compelling a scien-
tist’s expert testimony puts him at a “competitive disadvantage” in the
“scientific market place.”34  Furthermore, if their unpublished opinions
can be compelled at trial, or even at the pretrial stage,35 scientists fear
that the threat of disclosure will limit their freedom and ability later to
publish their opinions on related matters.36  Perhaps the most legiti-
mate concern, however, is that the unwilling expert will be caught in a
destructive cross-fire that results when the party disadvantaged by
the expert’s opinion or information undertakes to destroy the wit-
ness’s credibility.
Many “ordinary” witnesses, however, prefer not to be involved in
other peoples’ disputes.  It is not at all clear that the concerns of re-
luctant experts are more weighty than the concerns of these wit-
                                                          
32. See Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
33. See Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
34. See Mark Labaton, Note, Discovery and Testimony of Unretained Experts: Creating a
Clear and Equitable Standard to Govern Compliance with Subpoenas, 1987 DUKE L.J. 140,
143-44.
35. State law is often more rigorous that federal law in requiring public access to depo-
sition testimony or other records underlying even settled litigation.  See, e.g., Public Rec-
ords Act,  FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.01-.16 (West 1996).  Court files are explicitly included.  Id
§ 119.07(4); see, e.g., State v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Miami, 582 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990),
36. See Richard L. Marcus, Evidence:  Discovery Along the Litigation/Science Interface,
57 BROOK. L. REV. 381, 416-17 (1991) (describing the “publication” arguments but con-
cluding that these arguments can be taken too far).
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nesses.  Such complaints of scientists have been largely ignored.
Wigmore extended the duty to testify to experts and dismissed out-
right the notion that an expert might have some privilege that would
relieve him from his testimonial duty.  He offered many reasons why
an expert’s opinion testimony should not be privileged.  First, the ex-
pert who was asked to testify was not “render[ing] a professional
service,” but was “asked merely, as other witnesses are, to testify as to
what he knows or believes.”37  Second, the testimonial duty placed no
greater economic hardship on the expert than on ordinary citizens.
Although a professional might lose more in an absolute dollar amount
if forced to testify, both the professional and ordinary witness suffered
the same relative loss: a day’s wage.38  Finally, Wigmore noted that
both the expert and ordinary witnesses were called to testify because
of some happenstance.  However, while experts would not refrain from
entering their profession because of their duty to testify, ordinary wit-
nesses were often deterred from disclosing their observations “because
of the apprehension of being summoned as a witness.”39  Thus, public
policy offered at least one reason to protect ordinary witnesses but not
experts from their testimonial duty.
Courts have also long refused to recognize a distinction between
experts and ordinary witnesses.  For example, Chief Judge Tindal
noted in Lonergran v. Royal Exchange Assurance that “[t]here is no
reason for assuming that the time of medical men and attorneys is
more valuable than that of others whose livelihood depends on their
own exertions.”40  Judge Calvert Magruder in Dixon v. People further
reasoned that the:
witness who goes to court and testifies as to the facts of which he knows, is
subjected to a loss of his time, as much as a witness, who goes there to tes-
tify as an expert upon a mere matter of opinion … [,and] when [the expert]
is required to answer a hypothetical question, which involves a special
knowledge peculiar to his calling, he is merely required to do what every
good citizen is required to do in behalf of public peace and public order.41
Justice Roger Traynor in City & County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court held that the expert witness was “like any other witness with
knowledge of … acts; it is immaterial that he discovered them by rea-
son of his special training.”42  More recently, Judge Henry Friendly in
Kaufman v. Edelstein expressed the opinion that “[t]he truth of the
proposition that the high degree of a person’s knowledge excuses him
from giving testimony about it is not self-evident, to say the least.  As
Wigmore says … the giving of such testimony ‘may be a sacrifice …
                                                          
37. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2203, at 137.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 138.
40. 7 Bing. 729, 731 (C.P. 1831) (quoted in WIGMORE, supra note 10,  2203, at 138).
41. 48 N.E. 108, 110 (Ill. 1897).
42. 231 P.2d 26, 29 (Cal. 1951).
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[but i]t is a duty not to be grudged or evaded.’”43
The cases that have confronted the issue of compelled expert tes-
timony illustrate that the needs of courts and litigants often override
the desire of experts to remain on the sidelines.  In Kaufman v. Edel-
stein,44 the government subpoenaed two experts on electronic data
processing to testify in its antitrust litigation against IBM.  Their tes-
timony was needed to clarify the nature of the computer market and
the conduct of IBM.45  The district court held that the experts’ testi-
mony could be compelled and found that the testimony “promise[d] to
be highly productive and of assistance to the court in the trial of this
case.”46  Chief Judge Edelstein went on to note that the court’s need
for such information was legitimate because the subpoena was “an
attempt by the United States to summon a member of the public to
testify in a major government antitrust case, a case which, by defini-
tion, greatly affects the commonweal.”47  Affirming the district court,
Judge Friendly asserted that depriving the court of the unretained ex-
pert’s testimony was tantamount to depriving the court of the truth in
the litigation.  He concluded that a decision “[t]o clothe all such expert
testimony with privilege solely on the basis that the expert ‘owns’ his
knowledge free of any testimonial easement would … seal off too much
evidence important to the just determination of disputes.”48
The same rationale guided the decision in Wright v. Jeep Corp.49
This case involved the testimony and research of Professor Richard
Snyder, an expert on the safety of Jeeps who had studied the roll-over
rates of the Jeep CJ-5.50  Jeep Corporation wanted to depose Professor
Snyder in a personal injury action against it.  The court agreed to en-
force Jeep’s subpoena but required Jeep to pay the expenses Professor
Snyder incurred complying with the subpoena.  The court justified its
decision by explaining its need for the information in its search for the
truth.51  Professor Snyder’s research and conclusions were the most
likely basis of the testifying experts’ opinions.  Thus, depriving the
defendant of the opportunity to examine Professor Snyder also denied
it the opportunity to assess the validity of the testifying expert’s
claims.52  The court noted that:
[t]he value of [an expert’s] conclusions turns on the quality of the data and
                                                          
43. 539 F.2d 811, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Wigmore, supra note 10,  2192, at
72).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 812.
46. United States v. IBM Corp., 406 F. Supp. 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
47. Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 813 (quoting Judge Edelstein).
48. Id. at 821.
49. 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
50. Id. at 873.
51. Id. at 874.
52. Id.
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the methods used by the researcher in his analysis of that data as well as
the skill and perception of the researcher.  So if the conclusions or end
product of a research effort is to be fairly tested, the underlying data must
be available to others equally skilled and perceptive.53
In this case, testing the conclusions of a hired expert required the
court to compel the testimony of an unretained expert, Professor Sny-
der.
These decisions seem quite sound.  They inconvenience experts
and may embarrass them, but in no way that other citizens are not
also inconvenienced or embarrassed.  If there is special value in the
experts’ services, they may be reasonably compensated for that value.
Perhaps a more troublesome example is offered by the effort of a
medical malpractice plaintiff to summon a physician to testify against
a colleague working in the same hospital who employs a different
technique of treatment than does the unretained expert to be sum-
moned.  Under such circumstances, the showing of need required by
Rule 45 may be impossible.  It is almost certain that there will be
other physicians at other hospitals who are more or less equally
qualified to express an opinion on the suitability of a particular treat-
ment.  One suspects that the primary motive of the party seeking to
compel the testimony is to exploit a professional rivalry and artificially
increase the settlement value of his or her claim by loading the case
with a special and extraordinary cost to the defendant.  Rule 45 cer-
tainly permits, and may be taken in some cases to require, a court to
quash such a subpoena.
IV
REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF RESEARCH DATA
Under Rule 45, litigants are entitled to relevant documentary, as
well as testimonial, evidence.  The  entitlement to documentary evi-
dence is enforced through the use of a subpoena duces tecum.  Such a
subpoena functions to compel the production of all documents and
things relevant to litigation.  As Judge Lemuel Shaw once observed,
“[t]here seems to be no difference in principle between compelling a
witness to produce a document in his possession … and compelling
him to give testimony, when the facts lie in his own knowledge.”54
Wigmore stated that the duties were functional equivalents and that
any exception to the duty to provide documentary evidence had to be
limited.55
Scientists have argued that they should be exempt from the duty to
disclose research data and studies that have not been published.  The
                                                          
53. Id.
54. Bull v. Loveland, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 9, 14 (1830).
55. WIGMORE, supra note 10,  § 2193, at 74.
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scientists argue that such compelled disclosure is particularly repug-
nant to the norms and values of the scientific community.56  For ex-
ample, it is sometimes contended that such disclosure may force them
to breach the confidences of their research subjects.  Further, some
scientists argue that disclosing the data and results of a study before
those results are subject to peer review is irresponsible science.  Yet
another concern is that “hired guns” often advance marginal scientific
theories based on prematurely disclosed information.  Finally, some
scientists worry that the costs of such disclosure, both in lost oppor-
tunities to “sell” or publish the results and the expense of preparing
documents, might chill scientific research efforts.
In this context, too, it is not clear that the scientists’ concerns are
generically different or more urgent than those of us who would prefer
not to surrender documentary non-experts’ evidence embarrassing to
themselves.  Moreover, compelled disclosure does not presumptively
offend the norms of scientific research.  A tradition of open exchange
of information has characterized scientific research since the Indus-
trial Revolution.57  In fact, renowned scientists, such as C. P. Snow,
have argued against shrouding science in secrecy because such se-
crecy makes science “no better than a set of recipes, [losing] within a
generation … all its ideals and half its efficacy.”58  At least one legal
scholar has observed that courts should be skeptical of leaving sci-
ence to the scientists and failing to subject the claims of scientists to
the adversary process because fraud is not uncommon in science.59
Moreover, the imagined horrors resulting from disclosure can often be
prevented or controlled.  For example, confidentiality is not violated if
research is redacted to protect the identities of research subjects.
A court’s need for data can also outweigh the scientist’s interest in
exempting the data from compelled disclosure.  Scientists draw con-
clusions from their experiments and resultant data.  In turn, the
quality of any scientist’s conclusions is solely dependent on the qual-
ity of his or her underlying experiments and data.  Therefore, “if the
conclusions or end product of a research effort is to be fairly tested [in
litigation], the underlying data must be available to others equally
skilled and perceptive.”60  If a testifying expert’s conclusions are based
on an unretained scientist’s study, the only way for an adversary to
test these conclusions is to examine their underlying accuracy by
                                                          
56. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil, Judicially Compelled Disclosure of Research Data, 1 CTS.
HEALTH SCI. & L. 434, 434 (1991) (arguing that such disclosure violates the norms of the
medical research community).
57. Marcus, supra note 36, at 381.
58. C. P. SNOW, THE NEW MEN 130 (1954).
59. Marcus, supra note 36, at 388-89 (noting that even Congress has held hearings on
the rampant self-interest and self-promotion that accompanies scientific research and the
resultant improper research and fraud).
60. Deitchman v. E.R.  Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
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questioning the validity of the unretained expert’s data.  Cross-
examination is an important right of litigants, and “[t]o effectively
cross-examine the testifying expert, the attorney may have to dispute
the facts, data, or opinions on which the testifying expert bases his
opinion.”61
The courts that have compelled the disclosure of an unretained ex-
pert’s research data cite the importance of truth-seeking as the reason
for disclosure.  For example, in the most controversial case involving
compelled disclosure, In the Matter of the American Tobacco Com-
pany,62 the court based its decision on the unusual need for the data.
In this case, the unretained expert, Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, had studied
the effects of smoking and asbestos exposure on cancer and published
his conclusions.  Many of the testifying experts had relied on Dr. Se-
likoff’s published results in their testimony against large tobacco
companies.63  The tobacco companies requested Dr. Selikoff’s data,
hoping to cast doubt on their adversary’s experts’ opinions.  They
sought to re-examine his methods and his results.  The court found
that by publishing the results of his study, Dr. Selikoff had invited
other scientists to rely on his conclusions.  In turn, the public now
had an interest in resolving disputes that involved the accuracy of
those conclusions.64  The court realized that if the public’s interest
was not protected, testifying experts could powerfully state their
opinions, yet adverse parties could not scrutinize the validity of those
conclusions.65
A few courts, however, have refused to issue subpoenas compelling
the disclosure of research data.  In those few instances where sub-
poenas have been quashed, the courts have found that a just evalua-
tion of the testifying expert’s opinion did not require such disclosure.
For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen,66 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit quashed a government subpoena
for toxicity studies of an unretained expert.  The court found that
these studies were incomplete and that the testifying expert was not
relying on the studies.  As a result, the probative value of the disclo-
sure was found to be slight.
V
TWO POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The present Rule 45 is perfectly adequate to protect the legitimate
                                                          
61. Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 79.
62. 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 1522.
64. Id. at 1529-30.
65. Id.
66. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
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and appropriate rights of scientists who are reluctant to share their
opinions and information with lawyers, juries, and judges.  On the
other hand, it may be possible to improve the present system of re-
solving contested issues in a manner that would alleviate the distress
of the reluctant scientist.
One response to the concerns of scientists is for courts to make
use of Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to appoint the unre-
tained expert as a disinterested witness serving the court.  American
lawyers are prone to resist this practice because it diminishes their
control over their case.  They note that disinterested experts can also
make mistakes, and may bring intellectual biases to the formation of
an opinion in a particular case.  American judges were all lawyers
once, and are sympathetic with these concerns.  It may, however, be
that few judges generally regard the battle of experts as a search for
truth.  They are also often troubled by the difficulty of identifying a
suitably qualified and disinterested expert.
If the latter problem could be resolved, it might be possible to reach
a compromise with the concerns of counsel.  A disinterested report
acquired at an early stage of pretrial litigation could serve as the basis
for mediated settlement or stipulations narrowing the scope of opinion
evidence to be prepared for trial.  It could in many cases substantially
reduce the cost of trial preparation, and could thereby enable more
lawyers to participate effectively in the presentation of cases having a
scientific or technical dimension.  If a trial is conducted, the author of
the disinterested report might be called and subjected to the usual
examination, but there would in most cases be less reason for counsel
to suspect the witness of manipulating data to support a contrived
opinion.  Thus the frequency of collision between the interests of sci-
ence and the interests of the courts could be materially diminished.
A second and more radical step would bring American civil justice
closer to that found in the rest of the world.  The radical step would be
to re-characterize some matters of scientific opinion as issues of law,
not issues of fact.  Such a re-characterization would obligate courts to
take judicial notice of scientific literature bearing on an issue of law
that is called to its attention by counsel.  There would be no right of
cross-examination with respect to opinions and data so noticed.  With
respect to issues so re-characterized as issues of law, the court would
inform the jury of its conclusions, leaving to the jury only those issues
the court found itself unable to resolve on the basis of generally ac-
cepted scientific principles and methods.  The court would be obliged
to state the reasons for its conclusions, and its conclusions would be
subject to de novo review in the courts of appeals.  Determination of
scientific issues in higher courts would have the effect of precedent,
and would be binding on lower courts in all like cases. Less frequently
the court would find it necessary to resort to the sort of battle of ex-
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perts that has become so common in our courts.
Such a re-characterization would raise a novel issue under the
Seventh Amendment assuring the right to jury trial in civil cases.  We
are prone to the view that such a reform does not violate the constitu-
tional right.  In the purely historical terms by which the right has so
often been measured, there is no right to present opinion evidence be-
cause such evidence was virtually unknown in the 18th century.
Moreover, resorting to opinion evidence in a jury trial is functionally a
misuse of the jury.  The jury is a marvelous institution for resolving
swearing matches between witnesses who differ in their observations
of events, or for bringing the moral judgment of a community to bear
on a matter of dispute.  But juries have no particular utility in dealing
with scientific and technical issues.  Presentation of opinion evidence
prolongs trials, increases the burden on jurors, and makes it less
likely that employed persons can or will serve as jurors.  While it is
true that judges are not necessarily better qualified than jurors to deal
with testimony expressed in calculus or other foreign tongues, judges
can deal with such evidence much more efficiently.
In addition, the present characterization of scientific opinion as an
issue of fact means that scientific and technical issues are endlessly
litigated in different cases before different triers of fact.  This imposes
needless cost on everyone involved, and results in uneven and there-
fore unjust results.  Either a product is toxic or badly designed or not;
such issues warrant very close scrutiny, but not by hundreds and
even thousands of different triers of fact.  The current system invites
speculation on disparate outcomes and thereby impedes the process
of settlement.  In this respect, scientific issues are different in kind
from the matters of judgment about individual conduct that Justice
Holmes improvidently sought to re-characterize as legal standards.67
The path we suggest has been very recently marked by the Su-
preme Court in its holding that the meaning of words of art used to
define the scope of a patent, although informed by evidence, is an is-
sue of law to be decided by a judge, and not an issue of fact to be
submitted to a jury.68  The Court observed:
[I]n these cases a jury’s capabilities to evaluate demeanor, … to sense the
“mainsprings of human conduct,” … or to reflect community standards, …
are much less significant than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in
relation to the overall structure of the patent… . Finally, we see the impor-
tance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent
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reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court.69
Acknowledging as we do that this is a radical suggestion, and one
perhaps unlikely to gain serious consideration in the immediate fu-
ture, we will not burden the reader with further elaboration of its ad-
vantages and shortcomings.  It is presented here partly in the belief
that the idea has sufficient promise to warrant further consideration
by others, but especially because its consideration illuminates the
nature of the issue that is the subject of this symposium, for the
problem that we here address ought rightly be seen as an offspring of
the right to trial by jury in civil cases, an offspring of questionable le-
gitimacy.
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